Computational aspects of approval voting and declared-strategy voting
Computational social choice is a relatively new discipline that explores issues at the intersection of social choice theory and computer science. Designing a protocol for collective decision-making is made difficult by the possibility of manipulation through insincere voting. In approval voting syst...
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| Format: | Dissertation |
| Language: | English |
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ProQuest Dissertations & Theses
01-01-2008
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| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Computational social choice is a relatively new discipline that explores issues at the intersection of social choice theory and computer science. Designing a protocol for collective decision-making is made difficult by the possibility of manipulation through insincere voting. In approval voting systems, voters decide whether to approve or disapprove available alternatives; however, the specific nature of rational approval strategies has not been adequately studied. This research explores aspects of strategy under three different approval systems, from chiefly a computational viewpoint. While traditional voting systems elicit only the outcome of a voter's strategic thinking, a Declared-Strategy Voting (DSV) system accepts such strategies directly and applies them according to the voter's preferences over the available alternatives. Ideally, when rational strategies are employed on behalf of the voters, voters are discouraged from expressing insincere preferences. Approval voting is a natural fit for use with DSV, but, unlike for the common plurality voting system, there is no extant theory regarding the most effective approval strategies in a DSV context. We propose such a theory. |
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| ISBN: | 9780549646013 0549646019 |