Husserl and the problem of other minds

• Main Author: McFarland, Susan Marie
• Format: Dissertation
• Language: English
• Published: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses 01-01-1990
• Subjects: Philosophy
• ISBN: 9798206926033

This dissertation is a systematic examination of several approaches to the problem of other minds. Although the skeptical "problem of other minds" has a long history in philosophy, I argue that the problem itself is not adequately well-defined. I begin by distinguishing two distinct but related problems that fall under the label, which I call (1) the problem of skepticism with regard to the existence of other minds, and (2) the problem of skepticism with regard to the nature or content of other minds. The former is the more general problem: how can one know, or justify one's belief, that other human beings have minds? The latter concerns more particular beliefs: how can one know, or justify one's belief, that a given other person is in a given mental state at a given time? I first present the two more traditional and more widely accepted approaches to these problems, the analogical approach as discussed by Mill and Russell and defended by Ayer and others; and the criteriological approach as presented by Strawson and defended by both Strawson and Malcolm. I argue that neither of these is an adequate response. Then I present the phenomenological approach as developed by Husserl and defend it against objections. My aims in the thesis are threefold. First, as mentioned above, I attempt to clarify the nature of the "problem of other minds" and further the discussion of it within each of the three approaches I discuss. Second, since Husserl's response to the problems of other minds has received relatively little attention outside of phenomenology, I try to explicate it in a manner accessible to those outside that particular area in order to bring it into the wider context of the philosophy of mind. Third, I defend Husserl's argument against objections and attempt to show that it is an adequate and insightful response to skepticism about other minds.