From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans1

• Published in: Canadian journal of philosophy Vol. 39; no. 4; p. 515
• Main Authors: Elstein, Daniel Y, Hurka, Thomas
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Edmonton Cambridge University Press 01-12-2009
• Subjects: Concept mapping; Ethics; Judgment; Morality; Philosophers
• ISSN: 0045-5091; 1911-0820

Many philosophers of the last century thought all moral judgments can be expressed using a few basic concepts--what are today called 'thin' moral concepts such as 'good,' 'bad,' 'right,' and 'wrong.' This was the view, first, of the non-naturalists whose work dominated the early part of the century, including Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and C.D. Broad. Some of them recognized only one basic concept, usually either 'ought' or 'good'; others thought there were two. But they all assumed that other moral concepts, including such 'thick' ones as the virtue-concepts 'courageous' and 'kindly,' can be reductively analyzed using one or more thin concepts and some more or less determinate descriptive content. Here, Elstein and Hurka defend the reductive view of thick concepts by answering the most common argument against it, and in so doing defend a position held by more philosophers than the recent literature suggests.