A Reflection on Hadith Evidences Regarding the Validity of Official and Ordinary Documents in Islamic Law

• Published in: پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی Vol. 25; no. 3; pp. 567 - 596
• Main Author: Yazdan Taherabadi
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: Arabic
• Published: Imam Sadiq University in Iran, Islamic Republic of 01-09-2024
• Subjects: bayyinah; evidence; evidences in substantiation of claims; judge's knowledge; official document; ordinary document
• ISSN: 2251-9858; 2588-6673
• DOI: 10.30497/law.2024.245910.3506

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌The paper addresses the tension between traditional Islamic jurisprudence and contemporary legal practices concerning the use of documents as evidence. Traditionally, Islamic law has relied on methods such as the judge's knowledge, evidence [Bayyinah], confession, oath, and casting lots to prove claims. However, with the increasing reliance on official documents in modern legal systems, including those in Islamic countries, a new approach has emerged that often places documents above other forms of evidence. This article seeks to explore the validity of documents, both ordinary and official, within the context of Islamic law, particularly through the lens of hadith evidence.‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌The central research question explored in this article is: "To what extent can documents, both official and ordinary, be considered valid evidence in Islamic law, particularly in cases of conflict with traditional forms of proof such as Bayyinah and confession?" This question is vital for bridging the gap between contemporary legal practices and traditional Islamic jurisprudence.‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌The hypothesis proposed in the article is that presumptive documents do not constitute independent and authoritative evidence when compared to traditional methods such as knowledge, Bayyinah, and confession, according to hadith evidence. This hypothesis is founded on the Islamic principle derived from the Quran, specifically Surah Yunus, verses 36 and 59, which highlight the non-validity of presumption and conjecture in judicial matters. Therefore, unless explicit hadith evidence supports the validity of documents, their authority remains questionable.‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌The methodology involves Islamic ijtihad (jurisprudential reasoning) through an extensive review of library resources, including classical and contemporary works of Islamic jurists and legal scholars. The framework of the study systematically addresses several key aspects:     Conceptual Analysis of Documentation:     Definition and significance of documents in modern legal systems.     Traditional Islamic views on written statements and their evidentiary value.     Examination of Quranic and Hadith Evidences:     Analysis of Quranic verses pertinent to documentation and presumption.     Scrutiny of hadiths that may support or refute the validity of documents as evidence.     Comparison of Contemporary Legal Practices and Islamic Jurisprudence:     Exploration of the contemporary legal framework's reliance on documentation versus traditional Islamic evidentiary methods.     Evaluation of Jurisprudential Opinions:     Review of various juristic opinions, highlighting the majority view against the independent validity of documents.     Examination of minority opinions supporting the use of documentation based on principles like maintaining order and eliminating hardship.     Critical Analysis of Practical Implications:     Discussion on the practical implications of adopting documentation as valid evidence, including potential benefits such as reduced judicial backlog and avoidance of false testimony.‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌The analysis of Islamic jurisprudential texts and hadith evidence reveals a predominant view among Islamic jurists that presumptive documents do not hold validity as independent evidence. The primary principle within Islamic law is the invalidity of presumptions. Despite some jurists acknowledging the use of documents as proof, it remains unclear whether this acceptance is due to the conclusive knowledge they provide or an absolute statement inclusive of presumptive documents.     The article examines several hadiths that discuss the validity of documents. Two narrations from Abdullah ibn Sanan and Omar ibn Yazid were scrutinized but were insufficient to establish documents as valid proof. Conversely, narrations from Abi Khadija, Hussein ibn Saeed, Sa'd ibn Hisham, and Sakouni were considered. Among these, the narrations from Abi Khadija, the second narration from Sakouni, and Sa'd ibn Hisham did not provide clear or comprehensive evidence to invalidate the document's credibility. However, the narrations from Hussein ibn Saeed and the second narration from Sakouni were explicit and definitive, indicating that documents—whether ordinary or official—do not hold validity if they are presumptive.     The findings reinforce that the accepted methods of proof in Islamic law are limited to evidence [Bayyinah], testimony, confession, and oath. Other methods, including documents, do not hold the same status. If documents were inherently considered valid like Bayyinah and oath, they would have been explicitly mentioned and delineated within Islamic legal texts, similar to how the boundaries and conflicts of Bayyinah and oath are addressed.‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌The conclusion drawn from the analysis is that most Islamic jurists do not regard presumptive documents and writings as valid forms of evidence due to the primary principle of the invalidity of presumptions. Although there are references to documents as proof within juristic discussions, it remains ambiguous whether this acknowledgment is due to the conclusive knowledge they provide or an absolute acceptance that includes presumptive documents. The hadith evidence analyzed supports the view that documents, unless providing conclusive knowledge, do not hold validity as independent judicial evidence. Thus, traditional methods of proof such as Bayyinah, testimony, confession, and oath remain the primary and most reliable means within Islamic jurisprudence.