Analysis and Rejection of Infinite Regress Arguments and the Impossibility of Knowledge in the Dialogue of Parmenides Plato

• Published in: Ḥikmat va falsafah Vol. 18; no. 69; pp. 227 - 259
• Main Author: Mohamadmehdi Moghadas
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: Persian
• Published: Allameh Tabataba'i University Press 01-03-2022
• Subjects: epistemology; parmenides' dialogue; plato; self-participation; self-predication; theory of forms; third man argument
• ISSN: 1735-3238; 2476-6038
• DOI: 10.22054/wph.2022.64007.2021

In this essay, the first part of Parmenides' dialogue is analyzed. This dialogue presents two challenges to the theory of Forms: "Infinite Regress Arguments" or "Third Man Argument" and "impossibility of knowledge". At first, we try to yield a precise description of the first part of this dialogue, and then by analyzing Parmenides' arguments, we exhibit that his arguments are based on the assumptions of "Self-Predication", "One over Many", "Principle of Non-Identity" and "Principle of Uniqueness". We then make it clear that Parmenides is not justified in applying the assumption of Non-Identity and cannot make an Infinite Regress. Then we deal with the problem of the separation of Forms from the objects of this world and the subsequent "impossibility of knowledge" and by analyzing his arguments we show that Parmenides, in declaring the impossibility of knowledge, has committed at least two logical mistakes, and he then could not conclude that we do not partake of a Form of knowledge.