An experimental study of strong candidate stability
In this paper, we study the strong candidate stability of a voting procedure as defined by Dutta et al. [2001] through the experimental method. In this sense, a voting rule is said to be strongly candidate stable if the winner of the election remains unchanged after an attempted manipulation by stra...
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| Published in: | Recherches économiques de Louvain Vol. 80; no. 1; pp. 89 - 103 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English French |
| Published: |
01-01-2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | In this paper, we study the strong candidate stability of a voting procedure as defined by Dutta et al. [2001] through the experimental method. In this sense, a voting rule is said to be strongly candidate stable if the winner of the election remains unchanged after an attempted manipulation by strategic candidacy of a potential candidate. In an election with three candidates and a small electorate, we evaluate experimentally frequencies of the strong candidate stability of parliamentary voting rules and plurality. Reproduced by permission of Bibliothèque de Sciences Po |
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| Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
| ISSN: | 0770-4518 |
| DOI: | 10.3917/rel.801.0089 |