Approximate strategyproofness

The standard approach of mechanism design theory insists on equilibrium behaviour by participants. This assumption is captured by imposing incentive constraints on the design space. But in bridging from theory to practice, it often becomes necessary to relax incentive constraints in order to allow t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Current science (Bangalore) Vol. 103; no. 9; pp. 1021 - 1032
Main Authors:	Lubin, Benjamin, Parkes, David C.
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Current Science Association 10-11-2012
Subjects:	Approximation Auctions Bridging Economic theory Game theory Incentives Mathematical functions Mechanism design Payments Public schools Regret SPECIAL SECTION: GAME THEORY State of the art Surveys Tradeoffs Valuation
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	The standard approach of mechanism design theory insists on equilibrium behaviour by participants. This assumption is captured by imposing incentive constraints on the design space. But in bridging from theory to practice, it often becomes necessary to relax incentive constraints in order to allow tradeoffs with other desirable properties. This article surveys a number of different options that can be adopted in relaxing incentive constraints, providing a current view of the state-of-the-art.
Bibliography:	ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23
ISSN:	0011-3891