Accounting for the Specious Present A Defense of Enactivism

I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a skill. The explication and defense of this position depends on both phenomenological and empirical considerations. The central phenomenological claim is this: as a matter of human psychology, it is impo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	The Journal of mind and behavior Vol. 39; no. 3; pp. 181 - 204
Main Author:	Hasanoglu, Kaplan
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	New York Institute of Mind and Behavior, Inc 01-07-2018 Institute of Mind & Behavior
Subjects:	Cognition & reasoning Consciousness Phenomenology Science New York United States > US Massachusetts
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a skill. The explication and defense of this position depends on both phenomenological and empirical considerations. The central phenomenological claim is this: as a matter of human psychology, it is impossible to produce a conscious visual experience of a mind-independent object that is sufficiently like typical cases, without including concomitant proprioceptive sensations of the sort of extra-neural behavior that allows us to there and then competently detect such objects. I then argue that this view, which is a version of enactivism, best explains the temporality of conscious experience — what is often called the specious present.
ISSN:	0271-0137 2994-9602