Attack-resistance of computational trust models

• Published in: WET ICE 2003. Proceedings. Twelfth IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises, 2003 pp. 275 - 280
• Main Authors: Twigg, A., Dimmock, N.
• Format: Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Published: IEEE 2003
• Subjects: Certification; Computational modeling; Cryptography; Forgery; Laboratories; Peer to peer computing; Sampling methods; Security; Terminology; Web sites
• ISBN: 9780769519630; 0769519636
• ISSN: 1080-1383; 2375-5377
• DOI: 10.1109/ENABL.2003.1231420

The World Wide Web encourages widely-distributed, open, decentralized systems that span multiple administrative domains. Recent research has turned to trust management according to M. Blaze et al. (1996) as a framework for decentralizing security decisions in such systems. However, while traditional security measures such as cryptography and encryption are well-understood (theoretically and empirically), the same cannot be said for computational trust models. This paper describes the attack-resistance of several well-referenced trust models, in a move toward a possible framework and terminology for such analyses. We present a number of open questions, and consider possible future directions in the area.