Modeling and Verifying Physical Properties of Security Protocols for Wireless Networks

We present a formal model for modeling and reasoning about security protocols. Our model extends standard, inductive, trace-based, symbolic approaches with a formalization of physical properties of the environment, namely communication, location, and time. In particular, communication is subject to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium pp. 109 - 123
Main Authors: Schaller, P., Schmidt, B., Basin, D., Capkun, S.
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Published: IEEE 01-07-2009
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Summary:We present a formal model for modeling and reasoning about security protocols. Our model extends standard, inductive, trace-based, symbolic approaches with a formalization of physical properties of the environment, namely communication, location, and time. In particular, communication is subject to physical constraints, for example, message transmission takes time determined by the communication medium used and the distance traveled. All agents, including intruders, are subject to these constraints and this results in a distributed intruder with restricted, but more realistic, communication capabilities than those of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder. We have formalized our model in Isabelle/HOL and used it to verify protocols for authenticated ranging, distance bounding, and broadcast authentication based on delayed key disclosure.
ISBN:076953712X
9780769537122
ISSN:1063-6900
2377-5459
DOI:10.1109/CSF.2009.6