The non-first Amendment law of freedom of speech

• Published in: Harvard law review Vol. 134; no. 7; pp. 2299 - 2381
• Main Author: Lakier, Genevieve
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge Harvard Law Review Association 01-05-2021
• Subjects: 19th century; Analysis; COMMON LAW; Constitutional amendments; Constitutional law; Cultural values; First Amendment-US; FREEDOM OF SPEECH; History; JUDICIAL OPINIONS; Laws, regulations and rules; Legislators; Pluralism; Rights; Supreme courts; UNITED STATES
• ISSN: 0017-811X; 2161-976X

The First Amendment dominates debate about freedom of speech in the United States. Yet it is not the only legal instrument that protects expressive freedom, the rights of the institutional press, or the democratic values that these rights facilitate. A rich body of local, state, and federal laws also does so, and does so in ways the First Amendment does not. This Article explores the history and present-day operation of this non-First Amendment body of free speech law. Doing so changes our understanding of both the past and the present of the American free speech tradition. It reveals that there was more legal protection for speech in the nineteenth century than scholars have assumed. It also makes evident that the contemporary system of free expression is much more majoritarian, and much more pluralist in its conception of what freedom of speech means and requires, than what we commonly assume. Recognizing as much is important not only as a descriptive matter but also as a doctrinal one. This is because in few other areas of constitutional law does the Supreme Court look more to history to guide its interpretation of the meaning of the right. And yet, the Court's view of the relevant regulatory history is impoverished. Missing from the Court's understanding of freedom of speech is almost any recognition of the important nonconstitutional mechanisms that legislators have traditionally used to promote it. The result is a deeply inconsistent body of First Amendment law that relies on a false view of both our regulatory present and our regulatory past - and is therefore able to proclaim a commitment to laissez-faire principles that, in reality, it has never been able to sustain.