The Significance of the Phenomenon in Immanuel Kant’s and Edmund Husserl’s Transcendental Philosophy

• Published in: Phainomena Vol. 33; no. 128-129; pp. 27 - 47
• Main Author: Irfan Muhammad
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English; German
• Published: Institute Nova Revija for the Humanities 01-07-2024
• Subjects: human cognition; husserl; kant; phenomenon; transcendental idealism
• ISSN: 1318-3362; 2232-6650
• DOI: 10.32022/PHI33.2024.128-129.2

The article explores the concept of the phenomenon in the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl, arguing for the intricate connections and divergences between their philosophical frameworks. Kant’s transcendental idealism, rooted in the a priori knowledge and the conditions for human cognition, marks a pivotal shift from previous rationalist beliefs in non-empirical knowledge. By emphasizing phenomena as the ultimate objects of human cognition and asserting that the conditions for experience are inherent in the human mind, Kant lays the groundwork for a critical analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. In contrast, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology introduces a methodical approach to uncovering the essence of consciousness and phenomena. Central to Husserl’s transcendental idealism is the concept of intentionality, which serves as a bridge between consciousness and objects of knowledge. Unlike metaphysical idealism, Husserl’s transcendental idealism focuses on the correlation between phenomena and consciousness rather than solely on internal cognitive operations. The article navigates the evolution from Kant’s critical idealism to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, highlighting their shared emphasis on phenomena as the focal point of human cognition.