Experimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets

• Published in: Nature (London) Vol. 486; no. 7403; pp. 420 - 428
• Main Authors: Imai, Masaki, Watanabe, Tokiko, Hatta, Masato, Das, Subash C., Ozawa, Makoto, Shinya, Kyoko, Zhong, Gongxun, Hanson, Anthony, Katsura, Hiroaki, Watanabe, Shinji, Li, Chengjun, Kawakami, Eiryo, Yamada, Shinya, Kiso, Maki, Suzuki, Yasuo, Maher, Eileen A., Neumann, Gabriele, Kawaoka, Yoshihiro
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: London Nature Publishing Group UK 21-06-2012; Nature Publishing Group
• Subjects: 631/326/596/2563; 692/308; 692/699/255/1578; Academic libraries; Adaptation, Physiological - genetics; Animals; Avian flu; Avian influenza viruses; Biological and medical sciences; Bioterrorism - prevention & control; Birds - virology; Body Fluids - virology; Cell culture; Cell Line; Compliance; Disease transmission; Dogs; Epidemics; Evolution, Molecular; Experiments; Female; Ferrets; Ferrets - virology; Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology; Genetic aspects; Genetics; HEK293 Cells; HeLa Cells; Hemagglutinin Glycoproteins, Influenza Virus - genetics; Hemagglutinin Glycoproteins, Influenza Virus - metabolism; Host-virus relationships; Hot Temperature; Humanities and Social Sciences; Humans; Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype - genetics; Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype - pathogenicity; Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype - physiology; Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype - genetics; Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype - pathogenicity; Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype - physiology; Influenza in Birds - transmission; Influenza in Birds - virology; Influenza, Human - prevention & control; Influenza, Human - transmission; Influenza, Human - virology; Japan; Laboratories; letter; Mammals; Microbiology; Molecular Epidemiology - methods; multidisciplinary; Mutation; Occupational health; Orthomyxoviridae Infections - transmission; Orthomyxoviridae Infections - virology; Pandemics; Physiological aspects; Plasmids; Population Surveillance - methods; Prevention; Protein Stability; Proteins; Reassortant Viruses - genetics; Reassortant Viruses - isolation & purification; Reassortant Viruses - pathogenicity; Reassortant Viruses - physiology; Receptors, Virus - chemistry; Receptors, Virus - metabolism; Respiratory System - anatomy & histology; Respiratory System - virology; Risk assessment; RNA polymerase; Science; Science (multidisciplinary); Security Measures; Studies; Swine flu; Task forces; United States; Virology; Zoonoses - transmission; Zoonoses - virology; United States; Japan; Virus; Fissipedia; Carnivora; Vertebrata; Mammalia; Ferret; Transmission; Orthomyxoviridae; Pandemic; Mutation; Influenzavirus; Adaptation
• ISSN: 0028-0836; 1476-4687
• DOI: 10.1038/nature10831

Only four mutations in H5N1 HA are required to enable ferret-to-ferret transmission of a reassortant virus containing the H5 HA and the remaining seven gene segments from a human pandemic H1N1 influenza virus.
Elements involved in H5N1 transmission
Whether avian H5N1 viruses can gain the ability to transmit between humans was uncertain. The viral haemagglutinin protein (HA) mediates virus binding to host-specific cellular receptors, but previous studies have shown that alterations in HA that enable binding to human-type receptors are not sufficient to enable respiratory droplet transmission of H5N1 viruses in ferrets, the best animal model for human-to-human transmission. Imai
et al
. show that only four mutations in H5N1 HA are required to enable ferret-to-ferret transmission of a reassortant virus containing H5 HA, with the remaining genes from human pandemic H1N1 influenza virus. It is probable that further adaptations in other avian virus genes would be required to mediate transmission of wholly avian H5N1 in mammals, but human H1N1 and H5N1 viruses are genetically compatible and the emergence of H5-HA-containing viruses might be expected to cause a pandemic because humans lack immunity to H5 viruses. Knowledge of the mutations involved in adapting H5 HA to mammalian transmission could help with surveillance and monitoring of H5N1 viruses adapting towards pandemic potential.
Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza A viruses occasionally infect humans, but currently do not transmit efficiently among humans. The viral haemagglutinin (HA) protein is a known host-range determinant as it mediates virus binding to host-specific cellular receptors
1
,
2
,
3
. Here we assess the molecular changes in HA that would allow a virus possessing subtype H5 HA to be transmissible among mammals. We identified a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus—comprising H5 HA (from an H5N1 virus) with four mutations and the remaining seven gene segments from a 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus—that was capable of droplet transmission in a ferret model. The transmissible H5 reassortant virus preferentially recognized human-type receptors, replicated efficiently in ferrets, caused lung lesions and weight loss, but was not highly pathogenic and did not cause mortality. These results indicate that H5 HA can convert to an HA that supports efficient viral transmission in mammals; however, we do not know whether the four mutations in the H5 HA identified here would render a wholly avian H5N1 virus transmissible. The genetic origin of the remaining seven viral gene segments may also critically contribute to transmissibility in mammals. Nevertheless, as H5N1 viruses continue to evolve and infect humans, receptor-binding variants of H5N1 viruses with pandemic potential, including avian–human reassortant viruses as tested here, may emerge. Our findings emphasize the need to prepare for potential pandemics caused by influenza viruses possessing H5 HA, and will help individuals conducting surveillance in regions with circulating H5N1 viruses to recognize key residues that predict the pandemic potential of isolates, which will inform the development, production and distribution of effective countermeasures.