An Adjusted Payoff-Based Procedure for Normal Form Games

We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other agents. Each player, in order to update her mixed action, com...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Mathematics of operations research Vol. 41; no. 4; pp. 1469 - 1483
Main Author: Bravo, Mario
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Linthicum INFORMS 01-11-2016
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
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Summary:We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other agents. Each player, in order to update her mixed action, computes the average vector payoff she has obtained by using the number of times she has played each pure action. The resulting stochastic process is analyzed via the ODE method from stochastic approximation theory. We are interested in the convergence of the process to rest points of the related continuous dynamics. Results concerning almost sure convergence and convergence with positive probability are obtained and applied to a traffic game. We also provide some examples where convergence occurs with probability zero.
ISSN:0364-765X
1526-5471
DOI:10.1287/moor.2016.0785