The Effect of Private Information and Monitoring on the Role of Accounting Quality in Investment Decisions
We investigate how private information and monitoring affect the role of accounting quality in reducing the investment-cash flow sensitivity. We argue that access to private information and direct restrictions on investments are likely to affect the extent to which accounting quality reduces financi...
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Published in: | Contemporary accounting research Vol. 27; no. 1; pp. 17 - 47 |
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Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oxford, UK
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01-03-2010
Canadian Academic Accounting Association |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | We investigate how private information and monitoring affect the role of accounting quality in reducing the investment-cash flow sensitivity. We argue that access to private information and direct restrictions on investments are likely to affect the extent to which accounting quality reduces financing constraints. Our results suggest that, for financially constrained firms, banks' access to private information decreases the value of accounting quality. We further find that, for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms, covenants directly restricting capital expenditures also mitigate the importance of accounting quality. Our results suggest that, when information asymmetry problems are likely to be the largest, accounting quality is most important. However, the importance of accounting quality is mitigated if outside capital suppliers have access to private information and is eliminated if they impose contractual restrictions on investment. We also provide evidence that banks' access to private information reduces the cash flow sensitivity of cash and mitigates the importance of accounting quality in reducing this sensitivity. This additional evidence suggests that our investment-cash flow sensitivity results are not driven by measurement error of the investment opportunity set. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
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Bibliography: | ark:/67375/WNG-38ZTFM07-Z istex:29A0E2937900DC7B105637F5103E41C8143F5703 Accepted by Shivaram Rajgopal. Beatty thanks Deloitte & Touche for financial support. We thank Jennifer Altamuro, Ron Dye, Ben Lansford, Tom Lys, Waleed Muhana, Rick Johnston, Shail Pandit, Joe Piotroski, Shyam Sunder, Rick Young, Helen Zhang, and seminar participants at Stanford University, Northwestern University, and Ohio State University. ArticleID:CARE1000 ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0823-9150 1911-3846 |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01000.x |