A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules
We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with a bilateral principle, yields...
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| Published in: | Games and economic behavior Vol. 18; no. 1; pp. 55 - 72 |
|---|---|
| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Elsevier Inc
01-01-1997
Elsevier |
| Series: | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Abstract | We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with a bilateral principle, yields the corresponding consistent bankruptcy rule as a result of a unique outcome of Nash equilibria. The result holds for a large class of consistent and monotone rules, including the Constrained Equal Award, the Propositional Rule, and many other well known rules. Moreover, all of the subgame perefect equilibria are coalition-proof in the associated game in strategic form.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72 and D63. |
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| AbstractList | We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with a bilateral principle, yields the corresponding consistent bankruptcy rule as a result of a unique outcome of Nash equilibria. The result holds for a large class of consistent and monotone rules, including the Constrained Equal Award, the Propositional Rule, and many other well known rules. Moreover, all of the subgame perefect equilibria are coalition-proof in the associated game in strategic form.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72 and D63. |
| Author | Volij, Oscar Serrano, Roberto Dagan, Nir |
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| Snippet | We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully... |
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| SubjectTerms | Bankruptcy Economic behaviour Economic cooperation Game theory |
| Title | A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
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