A general defender-attacker risk model for networks

• Published in: The journal of risk finance Vol. 9; no. 3; pp. 244 - 261
• Main Authors: Al Mannai, W.I, Lewis, T.G
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: London Emerald Group Publishing Limited 01-01-2008; Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd
• Subjects: Binomial distribution; Mathematical models; Network security; Probability; Resource allocation; Risk management; Statistical analysis; Studies; Risk analysis; Risk management; Resource allocation
• ISSN: 1526-5943; 2331-2947
• DOI: 10.1108/15265940810875577

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to present a competitive defender-attacker risk model that assumes a dual exponential relationship between defender (Ci) and attacker (Ai) resource allocation: vi(Ai,Ci)=e−αici−e−αiCi−γiAi.Design methodology approach - Network risk is defined in terms of degree sequence, g, node link damage, d, and probability of failure, v: R=∑gividi. The paper finds the optimal allocation of resources (Ai, Ci) that minimizes R from the defender's point of view, and maximizes R from the attacker's point of view.Findings - The effectiveness of the optimal min-max strategy is compared with three allocation strategies: random, non-network, and network. It is shown that total network risk is minimized by the non-network strategy, because this strategy considers damage values and ignores network topology in the definition of risk.Originality value - The method is illustrated by applying it to critical infrastructure - a hypothetical water-and-power network.