A simple scheme to improve the efficiency of referenda

Referenda are becoming a common tool for public decision-making, and as reliance on direct democracy increases, so does the importance of giving representation to strongly held minority preferences. This paper discusses a very simple scheme that treats everybody symmetrically but gives weight to int...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Journal of public economics Vol. 92; no. 10; pp. 2240 - 2261
Main Authors:	Casella, Alessandra, Gelman, Andrew
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Elsevier B.V 01-10-2008 Elsevier
Series:	Journal of Public Economics
Subjects:	Decision making Direct democracy Elections Large elections Majority voting Majority voting system Preferences Referendum Referendum Voting Majority voting Large elections Storable votes Direct democracy Referendums Storable votes Voting Voting behaviour Storable votes Large elections Voting Referendum Direct democracy Majority voting
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Summary:	Referenda are becoming a common tool for public decision-making, and as reliance on direct democracy increases, so does the importance of giving representation to strongly held minority preferences. This paper discusses a very simple scheme that treats everybody symmetrically but gives weight to intense preferences: voters faced with a number of binary proposals are given one regular vote for each proposal plus a single additional bonus vote to cast as desired. Decisions are then taken according to the majority of votes cast. We study the scheme in a number of different models and identify empirically plausible conditions under which ex ante utility increases, relative to simple majority voting.
Bibliography:	ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23
ISSN:	0047-2727 1879-2316
DOI:	10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.002