Yours, Mine, and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior of Married Couples?

This paper examines how divorce laws affect couples' intertemporal choices and well-being. Exploiting panel variation in US laws, I estimate the parameters of a model of household decision-making. Household survey data indicate that the introduction of unilateral divorce in states that imposed...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American economic review Vol. 105; no. 8; pp. 2295 - 2332
Main Author: Voena, Alessandra
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Nashville American Economic Association 01-08-2015
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Summary:This paper examines how divorce laws affect couples' intertemporal choices and well-being. Exploiting panel variation in US laws, I estimate the parameters of a model of household decision-making. Household survey data indicate that the introduction of unilateral divorce in states that imposed an equal division of property is associated with higher household savings and lower female employment, implying a distortion in household assets accumulation and a transfer toward wives whose share in household resources is smaller than the one of their husband. When spouses share consumption equally, separate property or prenuptial agreements can reduce distortions and increase equity.
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ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.20120234