Cryptanalysis and improvement of an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
In SAC'05, Strangio proposed protocol ECKE- 1 as an efficient elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman two-party key agreement protocol using public key authentication. In this letter, we show that protocol ECKE-1 is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks. We also present an improved protocol...
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Published in: | IEEE communications letters Vol. 12; no. 2; pp. 149 - 151 |
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Main Authors: | , , , |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
New York, NY
IEEE
01-02-2008
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | In SAC'05, Strangio proposed protocol ECKE- 1 as an efficient elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman two-party key agreement protocol using public key authentication. In this letter, we show that protocol ECKE-1 is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks. We also present an improved protocol - ECKE-1N, which can withstand such attacks. The new protocol's performance is comparable to the well-known MQV protocol and maintains the same remarkable list of security properties. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-2 ObjectType-Feature-1 |
ISSN: | 1089-7798 1558-2558 |
DOI: | 10.1109/LCOMM.2008.071307 |