Cryptanalysis and improvement of an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol

In SAC'05, Strangio proposed protocol ECKE- 1 as an efficient elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman two-party key agreement protocol using public key authentication. In this letter, we show that protocol ECKE-1 is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks. We also present an improved protocol...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE communications letters Vol. 12; no. 2; pp. 149 - 151
Main Authors: Shengbao Wang, Zhenfu Cao, Strangio, M.A., Lihua Wang
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: New York, NY IEEE 01-02-2008
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
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Summary:In SAC'05, Strangio proposed protocol ECKE- 1 as an efficient elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman two-party key agreement protocol using public key authentication. In this letter, we show that protocol ECKE-1 is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks. We also present an improved protocol - ECKE-1N, which can withstand such attacks. The new protocol's performance is comparable to the well-known MQV protocol and maintains the same remarkable list of security properties.
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ISSN:1089-7798
1558-2558
DOI:10.1109/LCOMM.2008.071307