Recallable but not recognizable: The influence of semantic priming in recall paradigms

• Published in: Cognitive, affective, & behavioral neuroscience Vol. 21; no. 1; pp. 119 - 143
• Main Authors: Ozubko, Jason D., Sirianni, Lindsey Ann, Ahmad, Fahad N., MacLeod, Colin M., Addante, Richard J.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Springer US 01-02-2021; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Behavioral Science and Psychology; Cognition & reasoning; Cognitive Psychology; Cues; Electroencephalography; Evoked Potentials; Experiments; Failure; Humans; Memory; Mental Recall; Neurosciences; Paradigms; Psychology; Recall; Recognition, Psychology; Semantics; Event-related potentials; Priming; Familiarity; Recollection; Cued recall
• ISSN: 1530-7026; 1531-135X
• DOI: 10.3758/s13415-020-00854-w

When people can successfully recall a studied word, they should be able to recognize it as having been studied. In cued-recall paradigms, however, participants sometimes correctly recall words in the presence of strong semantic cues but then fail to recognize those words as actually having been studied. Although the conditions necessary to produce this unusual effect are known, the underlying neural correlates have not been investigated. Across five experiments, involving both behavioral and electrophysiological methods (EEG), we investigated the cognitive and neural processes that underlie recognition failures. Experiments
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and
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showed behaviorally that assuming that recalled items can be recognized in cued-recall paradigms is a flawed assumption, because recognition failures occur in the presence of cues, regardless of whether those failures are measured. With event-related potentials (ERPs), Experiments
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and
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revealed that successfully recalled words that are recognized are driven by recollection at recall and then by a combination of recollection and familiarity at ensuing recognition. In contrast, recognition failures did not show that memory signature and may instead be driven by semantic priming at recall and followed at recognition stages by negative-going ERP effects consistent with implicit processes, such as repetition fluency. These results demonstrate that recall – long-characterized as predominantly reflecting recollection-based processing in episodic memory – may at times also be served by a confluence of implicit cognitive processes.