The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Economics letters Vol. 107; no. 1; pp. 58 - 62
Main Authors:	Hoppe, Eva I., Schmitz, Patrick W.
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Elsevier B.V 01-04-2010 Elsevier
Series:	Economics Letters
Subjects:	Adverse selection Agency Cost-benefit analysis Hidden information Hidden information Adverse selection Information gathering. Information Information gathering Surplus Adverse selection Hidden information D86 Information gathering D82 C72
Online Access:	Get full text
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Description
Summary:	We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.
Bibliography:	ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23
ISSN:	0165-1765 1873-7374
DOI:	10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.026