The Appointment and Removal Process for judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence
This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Usin...
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| Published in: | Latin American politics and society Vol. 49; no. 2; pp. 33 - 58 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford, UK
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01-07-2007
University of Miami Cambridge University Press |
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| Abstract | This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control-defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party-permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals. |
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| AbstractList | ABSTRACT
This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control—defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party—permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals. This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control-defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party-permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control-defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party-permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals. Adapted from the source document. This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control—defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party—permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals. This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control-defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party-permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals. Reprinted by permission of Latin American Politics and Society , University of Miami |
| Author | Chávez, Rebecca Bill |
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| Copyright | Copyright 2007 University of Miami 2007 University of Miami Copyright University of Miami Summer 2007 |
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| DOI | 10.1111/j.1548-2456.2007.tb00406.x |
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| References_xml | – volume: 39 start-page: 87 issue: 3 year: 2004 end-page: 113 article-title: Judicial Reform in Argentina: How Electoral Incentives Shape Institutional Change publication-title: Latin American Research Review – volume: 4 start-page: 311 year: 1983 end-page: 37 article-title: The Role of the Argentine Judiciary in Controlling Governmental Action Under a State of Siege publication-title: Human Rights Law Journal – start-page: 55 year: 1993 end-page: 72 – year: 1999a – year: 1937 – start-page: 1 year: 1997 end-page: 11 – volume: 2 start-page: 59 year: 1996 end-page: 90 article-title: Las relaciones presidente‐congreso en Argentina 1983–1995 publication-title: PostData – year: 1998a – year: 1989 – year: 1994a – year: 2003 – year: 1995a – year: 1996 – volume: 35 start-page: 785 year: 1974 end-page: 819 article-title: Judicial Review in Latin America publication-title: Ohio State Law Journal – year: 1990a – volume: 1 year: 1984 – year: 1990 – year: 1994 – volume: 2 start-page: 46 year: 1998 end-page: 50 article-title: Amo y señor de San Luis publication-title: Tres Puntos – year: 1998 – year: 1993b – year: 1986 – year: 1999b – year: 1998b – year: 2002 – year: 1994b – volume: 36 start-page: 443 year: 1996 end-page: 74 article-title: Cuando el presidente gobierna solo: Menem y los decretos de necesidad y urgencia hasta la reforma constitucional, julio 1989‐agosto 1994 publication-title: Desarrollo Económico – volume: 1 start-page: 10 year: 1997 end-page: 11 article-title: El estado contra Vázquez publication-title: Tres Puntos – year: 1995b – year: 1997 – year: 1990b – year: 1995 – volume: 3 start-page: 15 year: 1996 end-page: 17 article-title: Los riesgos en el proyecto del gobiemo publication-title: Agrupación para una Justicia Democrática – year: 1993c – year: 1993 – year: 1999 – year: 1993a – volume: 58 start-page: 1 year: 1994 end-page: 3 article-title: La constitución evanescente publication-title: La Ley – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref13 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref36 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref61 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref88 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref55 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref4 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref78 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref17 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref32 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref71 – volume: 3 start-page: 15 year: 1996 ident: S1531426X00007810_ref34 article-title: Los riesgos en el proyecto del gobiemo publication-title: Agrupación para una Justicia Democrática contributor: fullname: Cruchaga – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref23 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref80 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref42 – start-page: 55 volume-title: Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Judiciary year: 1993 ident: S1531426X00007810_ref41 contributor: fullname: Fiss – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref69 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref65 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref62 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref14 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref10 – volume-title: Hacer la corte: la construcción de un poder absoluto sin justicia ni control year: 1993 ident: S1531426X00007810_ref92 contributor: fullname: Verbitsky – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref31 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref18 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref93 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref3 – volume: 2 start-page: 46 year: 1998 ident: S1531426X00007810_ref16 article-title: Amo y señor de San Luis publication-title: Tres Puntos contributor: fullname: Casas – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref35 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref77 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref72 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref39 – ident: S1531426X00007810_ref49 – volume: 36 start-page: 443 year: 1996 ident: S1531426X00007810_ref38 article-title: Cuando el presidente gobierna solo: Menem y los decretos de necesidad y urgencia hasta la reforma constitucional, julio 1989-agosto 1994 publication-title: Desarrollo Económico doi: 10.2307/3467401 contributor: fullname: Ferreira – volume-title: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model year: 1993 ident: S1531426X00007810_ref84 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| Snippet | This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the... ABSTRACT This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies... |
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| SubjectTerms | Appointment Appointments & personnel changes Argentina Attorneys Checks and Balances Competition Councils Discipline Executive branch Governors Impeachment Incentives Independence Judges Judges & magistrates Judicial appointments Judicial system Judiciary Juries Latin American studies Legislation Political freedom Political parties Political Systems Politics Power Presidents Tenure Upper houses |
| Title | The Appointment and Removal Process for judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence |
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