The Appointment and Removal Process for judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence

• Published in: Latin American politics and society Vol. 49; no. 2; pp. 33 - 58
• Main Author: Chavez, Rebecca Bill
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01-07-2007; University of Miami; Cambridge University Press
• Subjects: Appointment; Appointments & personnel changes; Argentina; Attorneys; Checks and Balances; Competition; Councils; Discipline; Executive branch; Governors; Impeachment; Incentives; Independence; Judges; Judges & magistrates; Judicial appointments; Judicial system; Judiciary; Juries; Latin American studies; Legislation; Political freedom; Political parties; Political Systems; Politics; Power; Presidents; Tenure; Upper houses
• ISSN: 1531-426X; 1548-2456
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-2456.2007.tb00406.x

This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control-defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party-permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals.