Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit

• Published in: Social choice and welfare Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 223 - 258
• Main Author: Grech, Philip D.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01-02-2021; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Councils; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Economics; Economics and Finance; EU membership; Game Theory; Indexes; International Political Economy; Original Paper; Power; Public Finance; Social and Behav. Sciences; Social Policy; Voting; Brexit; Council of the European Union; A posteriori voting power
• ISSN: 0176-1714; 1432-217X
• DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01273-z

We aim to estimate the power distribution in the Council of the European Union—both a priori and a posteriori. With respect to the latter, our analysis suggests that several previously used indices are ill-suited for this application. By introducing minimal modifications, we propose a new index and compare it with previous constructions in a unified framework. Empirically, we find that that all countries gain a priori voting power in the Council as a result of Brexit. We rely on data from the Chapel Hill Expert survey to compute a posteriori power and find that it is more unequally distributed than a priori power. Specifically, a posteriori power is almost exclusively held by relatively few rather populous states (yet not the United Kingdom). As regards Brexit, France appears as the main benefactor in terms of gaining a posteriori power; Poland loses substantive power in several areas but remains one of the most powerful EU member states.