Noumenal Power
In political or social philosophy, we speak about power all the time. Yet the meaning of this important concept is rarely made explicit, especially in the context of normative discussions. But as with many other concepts, once one considers it more closely, fundamental questions arise, such as wheth...
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| Published in: | The journal of political philosophy Vol. 23; no. 2; pp. 111 - 127 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01-06-2015
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | In political or social philosophy, we speak about power all the time. Yet the meaning of this important concept is rarely made explicit, especially in the context of normative discussions. But as with many other concepts, once one considers it more closely, fundamental questions arise, such as whether a power relation is necessarily a relation of subordination and domination, a view that makes it difcult to identify legitimate forms of the exercise of power. To contribute to conceptual as well as normative clarication, in what follows I suggest a novel way to conceive of power. I argue that we only understand what power is and how it is exercised once we understand its essentially noumenalnature. On that basis, I defend a normatively neutral notion of power thatenables us to distinguish more particular forms of power, such as rule, coercion,or domination. The analysis aims to prepare the way for a critical theory of power. Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers |
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| Bibliography: | ArticleID:JOPP12046 ark:/67375/WNG-24QDJG3N-Z A first version of this paper was prepared for a panel on power organized by Casiano Hacker-Cordón at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington in September 2010. I am grateful to C. Hacker-Cordón and Frank Lovett for their comments on that occasion. I also presented versions of the paper at the New School for Social Research in New York, the Humboldt University in Berlin, the Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, the Philosophy and Social Science Conference in Prague, the Université de Strasbourg, the University of Southampton and the Lichtenberg-Kolleg in Göttingen. I am indebted to the discussions at these events and many more conversations with colleagues. For helpful recommendations and critique I wish to thank in particular Bruce Ackerman, Amy Allen, Chris Armstrong, Albena Azmanova, Richard Bernstein, Thomas Biebricher, Jean Cohen, Maeve Cooke, Erin Cooper, Ciaran Cronin, Eva Erman, Alessandro Ferrara, Estelle Ferrarese, Nancy Fraser, Dorothea Gädeke, Pablo Gilabert, Klaus Günther, Mark Haugaard, Malte Ibsen, Rahel Jaeggi, Jane Mansbridge, Christoph Möllers, Dmitri Nikulin, David Owen, Paul Patton, Hartmut Rosa, Martin Saar, Bill Scheuerman, Ian Shapiro, Holmer Steinfath, David Strecker, James Tully, Martin van Gelderen, Lea Ypi, Eli Zaretsky, and Michael Zürn-and two anonymous reviewers for this journal. istex:D8CD073DF51E9F1B191029D33692A8739A69F22D ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 |
| ISSN: | 0963-8016 1467-9760 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/jopp.12046 |