Abreu–Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence
Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms can be applied to a broad class of games to induce any desired outcome as the unique rationalizable outcome. We conduct experiments investigating the performance of such mechanisms in two simple coordination games. In these games one pure-strategy equilibrium is “focal”;...
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| Published in: | Games and economic behavior Vol. 16; no. 2; pp. 280 - 302 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Elsevier Inc
01-10-1996
Elsevier |
| Series: | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms can be applied to a broad class of games to induce any desired outcome as the unique rationalizable outcome. We conduct experiments investigating the performance of such mechanisms in two simple coordination games. In these games one pure-strategy equilibrium is “focal”; we assess the efficacy of Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms for implementing the other pure-strategy equilibrium outcome. Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms induce some choices consistent with the desired outcome, but more choices reflect the focal outcome. Moreover, “strengthening” the mechanism has a perverse effect when the desired outcome is a Pareto-dominated risk-dominated equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C7. |
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| Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 1090-2473 |
| DOI: | 10.1006/game.1996.0087 |