Informed trading around acquisitions: Evidence from corporate bonds

• Published in: Journal of financial markets (Amsterdam, Netherlands) Vol. 18; pp. 182 - 205
• Main Authors: Kedia, Simi, Zhou, Xing
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier B.V 01-03-2014
• Subjects: Corporate bond market; Informed trading; Merger and acquisition; Transparency; G34; Transparency; G14; Informed trading; Merger and acquisition; Corporate bond market
• ISSN: 1386-4181; 1878-576X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2013.07.002

This paper examines the prevalence of informed trading in corporate bonds prior to takeover announcements. We find significant pre-announcement trading activities and price movements in target bonds, in directions consistent with the nature of pending information. Improved transparency in the bond markets achieved by the implementation of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system reduces the incidence of informed trading. Further, there is some weak evidence that dealers affiliated with merger and acquisition advisors sell in anticipation of negative news, pointing to a possible channel of information leakage. Such negative news seems to be incorporated into bond prices no slower than into the target stocks.
•We examine the prevalence of informed trading in corporate bonds before takeover announcements.•We find a price run-up/decline in target bonds that stand to gain/lose during the pre-announcement periods. This finding suggests the role of information.•Improvements on market transparency reduce the incidence of informed trading in bonds.•Bond dealers affiliated with M&A advisors tend to sell more of the bonds that stand to lose.•Negative news is incorporated into bond prices no slower than into the target stocks.