Do two bribe less than one? - An experimental study on the four-eyes-principle

We incorporate a four-eyes-mechanism on the briber's side into a bribery game. Our results are mixed. We find no effect of the mechanism in a one-shot setting, but a reduction of bribes when the setting is repeated.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Applied economics letters Vol. 26; no. 3; pp. 191 - 195
Main Authors:	Bodenschatz, Anja, Irlenbusch, Bernd
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	London Routledge 06-02-2019 Taylor & Francis LLC
Subjects:	Bribery Corruption Delegation of authority Economic analysis Economic theory Economics experiment Experiments four-eyes-principle
Online Access:	Get full text
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Description
Summary:	We incorporate a four-eyes-mechanism on the briber's side into a bribery game. Our results are mixed. We find no effect of the mechanism in a one-shot setting, but a reduction of bribes when the setting is repeated.
ISSN:	1350-4851 1466-4291
DOI:	10.1080/13504851.2018.1456644