Encouraging recycling among households in Malaysia: Does deterrence matter?

• Published in: Waste management & research Vol. 37; no. 7; pp. 755 - 762
• Main Authors: Ogiri, Ibrahim Aishatu, Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi, Talib, Mansor Abu, Abdul-Rahim, Abdul Samad, Radam, Alias
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: London, England SAGE Publications 01-07-2019; Sage Publications Ltd
• Subjects: Compliance; Households; Recycling; Sanctions; Separation; Structural equation modeling; Waste sorting; Malaysia; deterrence; Recycling; households; compliance; structural equation model
• ISSN: 0734-242X; 1096-3669
• DOI: 10.1177/0734242X19842328

To encourage recycling in Malaysian households, a waste separation at source programme was implemented that made it mandatory for households to sort their waste into different categories before leaving it out for collection. Penalties designed to act as a deterrent are imposed on households that fail to sort their waste appropriately. But does this deterrence motivate compliance with the programme directives? This study employs the deterrence theory to investigate if deterrence alone is sufficient to motivate households to actively participate in recycling. A total of 866 questionnaires were administered in person in households in Putrajaya and Melaka. Data were analysed using structural equation modelling. The results of the structural model reveal that just 25% of the variance in compliance is explained by the severity of the sanction, and the perceived certainty of penalty imposed. Perceived severity of sanction (β = 0.149, p = 0.012) and perceived certainty of sanction (β = 0.383, p = 0.000) were found to contribute significantly to compliance behaviour to the programme directives. However, deterrence alone cannot motivate household participation in waste separation at source because it only explains 25% of compliance behaviour. The present study provides information that could allow policymakers to understand recycling habits better and implement more effective compliance strategies.