The dual-process theory of moral judgment does not deny that people can make compromise judgments

The dual-process theory of moral judgment does not deny that people can make compromise judgments

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS Vol. 120; no. 6; p. e2220396120
Main Author: Greene, Joshua D
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: United States National Academy of Sciences 07-02-2023
Subjects:
Biological Sciences
Humans
Judgment
Morals
Social Sciences
Online Access:Get full text
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Description
Bibliography:SourceType-Other Sources-1
content type line 63
ObjectType-Correspondence-1
ObjectType-Commentary-2
ISSN:0027-8424
1091-6490
DOI:10.1073/pnas.2220396120