The Constrained Instability of Majority Rule: Experiments on the Robustness of the Uncovered Set

• Published in: Political analysis Vol. 16; no. 2; pp. 115 - 137
• Main Authors: Bianco, William T., Lynch, Michael S., Miller, Gary J., Sened, Itai
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York, US Cambridge University Press 01-04-2008; Oxford University Press
• Subjects: Adjournments; Cash; Chalkboards; Chaos theory; Committees; Coordinate systems; Experiment design; Game Theory; Majority Rule; Majority voting; Political analysis; Political theory; Preferences; Social Choice; Voting; Voting Behavior
• ISSN: 1047-1987; 1476-4989
• DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpm024

The uncovered set has frequently been proposed as a solution concept for majority rule settings. This paper tests this proposition using a new technique for estimating uncovered sets and a series of experiments, including five-player computer-mediated experiments and 35-player paper-format experiments. The results support the theoretic appeal of the uncovered set. Outcomes overwhelmingly lie in or near the uncovered set. Furthermore, when preferences shift, outcomes track the uncovered set. Although outcomes tend to occur within the uncovered set, they are not necessarily stable; majority dominance relationships still produce instability, albeit constrained by the uncovered set.