Intentionality Versus Constructive Empiricism

By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism—B. C. van Fraassen's much debated and explored view of science—is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Erkenntnis Vol. 76; no. 1; pp. 91 - 100
Main Authors:	Buekens, F. A. I., Muller, F. A.
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Dordrecht Springer 01-01-2012 Springer Netherlands Springer Nature B.V
Subjects:	Astronomical objects Constructive empiricism Education Epistemology Ethics Human agency Intentionality Logic Molecules Naturalism Observed choices Ontology Original Article Parchment Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language Philosophy Philosophy of science Physicalism Scientific observation Intentional Object Visual Attention Concrete Object Human Agency Intentional Action Analytical Philosophy Cognition
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Summary:	By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism—B. C. van Fraassen's much debated and explored view of science—is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other.
ISSN:	0165-0106 1572-8420
DOI:	10.1007/s10670-011-9348-1