Informal cash payments for birth in Hungary: Are women paying to secure a known provider, respect, or quality of care?

• Published in: Social science & medicine (1982) Vol. 189; pp. 86 - 95
• Main Authors: Baji, Petra, Rubashkin, Nicholas, Szebik, Imre, Stoll, Kathrin, Vedam, Saraswathi
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: England Elsevier Ltd 01-09-2017; Pergamon Press Inc
• Subjects: Adult; Cash payments; Childbirth; Childbirth & labor; Continuity of care; Cross-Sectional Studies; Epidural; Episiotomy; Evidence-based practice; Female; Health care costs; Health care expenditures; Health Expenditures - statistics & numerical data; Health Personnel - economics; Health Personnel - standards; Humans; Hungary; Informal payments; Internet; Intervention; Maternal child nursing; Maternity care; Mothers; Obstetric interventions; Obstetrics; Parturition - psychology; Patient Care - economics; Payments; Physicians; Polls & surveys; Prenatal care; Quality; Quality of care; Quality of Health Care - economics; Regression Analysis; Sociodemographics; Surveys and Questionnaires; Women; Womens health; Hungary; Continuity of care; Health care costs; Hungary; Informal payments; Quality; Maternity care; Childbirth; Obstetric interventions
• ISSN: 0277-9536; 1873-5347
• DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.07.015

In Central and Eastern Europe, many women make informal cash payments to ensure continuity of provider, i.e., to have a “chosen” doctor who provided their prenatal care, be present for birth. High rates of obstetric interventions and disrespectful maternity care are also common to the region. No previous study has examined the associations among informal payments, intervention rates, and quality of maternity care.
We distributed an online cross-sectional survey in 2014 to a nationally representative sample of Hungarian internet-using women (N = 600) who had given birth in the last 5 years. The survey included items related to socio-demographics, type of provider, obstetric interventions, and experiences of care. Women reported if they paid informally, and how much. We built a two-part model, where a bivariate probit model was used to estimate conditional probabilities of women paying informally, and a GLM model to explore the amount of payments. We calculated marginal effects of the covariates (provider choice, interventions, respectful care).
Many more women (79%) with a chosen doctor paid informally (191 euros on average) compared to 17% of women without a chosen doctor (86 euros). Based on regression analysis, the chosen doctor's presence at birth was the principal determinant of payment. Intervention and procedure rates were significantly higher for women with a chosen doctor versus without (cesareans 45% vs. 33%; inductions 32% vs. 19%; episiotomy 75% vs. 62%; epidural 13% vs. 5%), but had no direct effect on payments. Half of the sample (42% with a chosen doctor, 62% without) reported some form of disrespectful care, but this did not reduce payments.
Despite reporting disrespect and higher rates of interventions, women rewarded the presence of a chosen doctor with informal payments. They may be unaware of evidence-based standards, and trust that their chosen doctor provided high quality maternity care.
•Informal payments for maternity care are common, and do not increase quality of care.•Payments are issued because women want their chosen provider present at the birth.•Women with chosen doctors undergo more interventions, yet report more respectful care.•Neither high obstetric interventions nor disrespectful care decrease payments.•Women may be unaware of evidence-based standards for high quality maternity care.