Managerial incentives for undertaking exchange offers

This paper empirically examines management's motivation to convey information regarding firm value through exchange offers. We report a positive relation between stock price reactions to announcements of exchange offers and managerial stockholdings, and a weak negative relation with salary plus...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Managerial and decision economics Vol. 15; no. 4; pp. 369 - 381
Main Authors:	Joshi, Yash P., Makhija, Anil K.
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	London John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 01-07-1994 John Wiley and Sons Heyden and Son Wiley Periodicals Inc
Series:	Managerial and Decision Economics
Subjects:	Business valuation Capital structure Chief executive officers Common stock Compensation Economic models Equity Exchange offers Executive compensation Financial economics Financial leverage Financial management Incentives Proxy statements Stock options Stock prices Stock transactions Stockholders Studies Tender offers Wages & salaries United States > US
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	This paper empirically examines management's motivation to convey information regarding firm value through exchange offers. We report a positive relation between stock price reactions to announcements of exchange offers and managerial stockholdings, and a weak negative relation with salary plus bonus. These findings are consistent with the incentives required for managers to signal firm value through exchange offer-induced leverage change.
Bibliography:	ArticleID:MDE4090150410 ark:/67375/WNG-KRWPL0RH-W istex:EFD2527DD7E2EB82001B11E930A8191BAC72D173
ISSN:	0143-6570 1099-1468
DOI:	10.1002/mde.4090150410