The ‘default de re’ principle for the interpretation of belief utterances

• Published in: Journal of pragmatics Vol. 28; no. 3; pp. 315 - 336
• Main Author: Jaszczolt, K.M.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 1997; Elsevier; North-Holland Pub. Co
• Subjects: Descriptive studies and applied theories; Linguistics; Semantics and pragmatics; Belief; Intentionality; Reference; Enunciation/Statement ;Utterance/Statement;Utterance; Conversational analysis; Ambiguity; Pragmatics
• ISSN: 0378-2166; 1879-1387
• DOI: 10.1016/S0378-2166(97)00006-4

It is widely acknowledged in the literature that reports on beliefs of the type ‘A believes that B ϕs’ are systematically ambiguous between the
de re reading, when they concern a particular, known individual or object, and
de dicto reading, about whoever fits the name or description. It is argued in this paper that, in conversation, the
de re interpretation is the more salient or ‘default’ interpretation of belief reports. This claim is derived from the argument that the
referential interpretation is the more salient, ‘default’ reading of belief expressions of the form ‘B ϕs’. The paper presents an argument for the priority of the referential/
de re interpretation based on the idea of
intentionality of acts of consciousness. It puts forward a tripartite distinction for the interpretation of expressions of belief (‘B ϕs’) and reports on beliefs (‘A believes that B ϕs’). It is based on the distinction between referring correctly to a known individual, referring that involves a referential mistake, and talking about an unknown individual. This distinction on the level of belief expressions has been related to the distinction on the level of belief reports. Corresponding reports are called here
de re, de dicto
1
and
de dicto
2
. Both distinctions are compared to the
de relde dicto distinction on the level of belief. It is argued that these three levels of analysis are mutually dependent and indispensable for a pragmatic study of utterances expressing beliefs and belief reports.