Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums
Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of...
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Published in: | The journal of real estate finance and economics Vol. 35; no. 1; pp. 23 - 38 |
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Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Norwell
Springer Nature B.V
01-07-2007
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0895-5638 1573-045X |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9 |