Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums

Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The journal of real estate finance and economics Vol. 35; no. 1; pp. 23 - 38
Main Authors: Rutherford, Ronald C, Springer, Thomas M, Yavas, Abdullah
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Norwell Springer Nature B.V 01-07-2007
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Summary:Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
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ISSN:0895-5638
1573-045X
DOI:10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9