Point at, nudge, or push private provision of a public good?

How decision makers respond to behavioral and traditional interventions might depend on their and the regulator's attributes. This online experiment investigates the effect of defaults, recommendations, and mandatory minimum contributions accompanied by regulator information on the private prov...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic inquiry Vol. 59; no. 3; pp. 996 - 1007
Main Authors: Bruns, Hendrik, Perino, Grischa
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Boston, USA Wiley Periodicals, Inc 01-07-2021
Western Economic Association
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Summary:How decision makers respond to behavioral and traditional interventions might depend on their and the regulator's attributes. This online experiment investigates the effect of defaults, recommendations, and mandatory minimum contributions accompanied by regulator information on the private provision of climate protection, accounting for intrinsic motivation. Findings show that all interventions increase the propensity of individuals to choose the focal value. There is no evidence that recommendations and defaults change average contributions. We report a negative interaction of the default with intrinsic motivation. Expert or political regulator information decreases intervention effectiveness. The study improves our understanding of behavioral public policy instruments.
Bibliography:Funding information
International Max‐Planck Research School on Earth System Modelling; Universität Hamburg
ISSN:1465-7295
0095-2583
1465-7295
DOI:10.1111/ecin.12981