Universals, laws, and governance

• Published in: Philosophical studies Vol. 173; no. 5; pp. 1147 - 1163
• Main Author: Tugby, Matthew
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer 01-05-2016; Springer Netherlands; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Aristotelianism; Cognition & reasoning; Education; Epistemology; Ethics; Instantiation; Law; Legal entities; Metaphysics; Natural kinds; Ontological essence; Other things equal assumption; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of law; Philosophy of Mind; Plato (427-347 BC); Platonism; Realism; Theory; Universals; Laws; Platonism; Aristotelianism; Explanation; Dispositions
• ISSN: 0031-8116; 1573-0883
• DOI: 10.1007/s11098-015-0521-2

Proponents of the dispositional theory of properties typically claim that their view is not one that offers a realist, governing conception of laws. My first aim is to show that, contrary to this claim, if one commits to dispositionalism then one does not automatically give up on a robust, realist theory of laws. This is because dispositionalism can readily be developed within a Platonic framework of universals. Second, I argue that there are good reasons for realist dispositionalists to favour a Platonic view. This is because the alternative Aristotelian version of dispositionalism, on which universals are immanent entities, is unstable for various reasons. My final aim is to address a common criticism facing Platonic theories of laws, which is the problem of how external entities can play an explanatory role where the world's law-like patterns of behaviour are concerned. I argue that the Platonists' response to the one over many problem can help to shed light on this matter, and a possible solution is sketched, one which makes use of the notions of essence, constitution and ontological dependence.