30 years after the nobel: James Buchanan’s political philosophy

• Published in: The Review of Austrian economics Vol. 31; no. 2; pp. 151 - 167
• Main Author: Munger, Michael C.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Springer US 01-06-2018; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Anarchism; Buchanan, James M; Decentralization; Economic theory; Economics; Economics and Finance; Economists; History of Economic Thought/Methodology; Individualism; Methodological individualism; Neutrality; Nobel prizes; Political philosophy; Political Science; Politics; Public choice; Public Finance; Symmetry; B31; B53; Methodological individualism; James Buchanan; Subjectivism; Public choice; Institutions; B52; D71
• ISSN: 0889-3047; 1573-7128
• DOI: 10.1007/s11138-018-0418-3

There are three main foundations of Public Choice theory: methodological individualism, behavioral symmetry, and “politics as exchange.” The first two are represented in nearly all work that identifies as “Public Choice,” but politics as exchange is often forgotten or de-emphasized. This paper—adapted from a lecture given on the occasion of the 30th year after Buchanan’s Nobel Prize—fleshes out Buchanan’s theory of politics as exchange, using four notions that are uniquely central to his thought: philosophical anarchism, ethical neutrality, subjectivism, and the “relatively absolute absolutes.” A central tension in Buchanan’s work is identified, in which he seems simultaneously to argue both that nearly anything agreed to by a group could be enforced within the group as a contract, and that there are certain types of rules and arrangements, generated by decentralized processes, that serve human needs better than state action. It is argued that it is a mistake to try to reconcile this tension, and that both parts of the argument are important.