Loyal Political Cartels and Committee Assignments in Congress: Evidence from the Congressional Black Caucus

• Published in: Public choice Vol. 108; no. 3/4; pp. 313 - 330
• Main Authors: Mixon, Franklin G., Ressler, Rand W.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers 01-09-2001; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Budget appropriations; Cartels; Caucuses; Committees; Congressional committees; Congressional elections; Congressional voting; Democracy; Economic models; Economics; Election results; Game theory; Group behaviour; Jurisdiction; Legislative Bodies; Legislative power; Legislators; Loyalty; Monopolies; PAC; Policy making; Political action committees; Political Affiliation; Political behavior; Political behaviour; Political leadership; Political parties; Political Representation; Politicians; Politics; Redistricting; Standing committees; Statistical analysis; Studies; Voting Behavior; United States > US
• ISSN: 0048-5829; 1573-7101
• DOI: 10.1023/A:1017560923687

This study presents a political model which suggests that monopoly legislators form cartel-like organizations (referred to as "memberships") in an effort to extract greater benefits in the political process. Based on a model by Coker and Crain (1994) that provides theoretical and statistical arguments for congressional committees as loyalty-generating institutions, the instant research examines committee placement of "members" of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in the U.S. House by Democrat leaders. Voting records indicate that the CBC is uniform in its voting patterns, indicating cartel-like behavior. Because of this, the Democratic leadership in the House chooses to place CBC members on important committees in order to support their policy agenda. The general finding of this study is that "black representation" may be greater than simply the proportion of seats held by black Representatives.