Preliminary accident analysis of the loss of vacuum in vacuum vessel for the European DEMO HCPB blanket concept

Design basis accidents are investigated continuously for the European DEMO reactor accompanying its development. One selected postulated initial event (PIE) is a loss of vacuum (LOVA) in vacuum vessel (VV) with large ingress of air induced by rupture in a VV penetration. It has been investigated for...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Nuclear fusion Vol. 64; no. 5; pp. 56038 - 56056
Main Authors: Jin, Xue Zhou, Raskob, Wolfgang
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: IOP Publishing 01-05-2024
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Summary:Design basis accidents are investigated continuously for the European DEMO reactor accompanying its development. One selected postulated initial event (PIE) is a loss of vacuum (LOVA) in vacuum vessel (VV) with large ingress of air induced by rupture in a VV penetration. It has been investigated for the helium cooled pebble bed (HCPB) blanket concept according to the DEMO baseline 2017. The associated primary heat transfer system (PHTS) and the related systems in the tokamak building, from the VV to the PHTS vault and galleries, are considered for the investigation. The LOVA is postulated to occur at a port seal of the electron cyclotron equatorial port plug on the side of the closure plate with (i) a small leak of 1.0 × 10 −3 m 2 , or (ii) a large break size of 1.0 × 10 −2 m 2 . Air ingress from one port cell into the VV leads to the VV pressurization and the fusion power termination followed by an unmitigated plasma disruption. A loss of off-site power for 32 h is assumed to coincide with the disruption. An in-vessel loss of coolant accident (LOCA) is considered as a consequence if the affected first wall (FW) reaches the defined temperature of 1000 °C. The radioactive inventories in the VV (tritium, W-dust) can mobilize towards the VVPSS, the affected systems in the building and the environment due to pressurization, venting and leak conditions. MELCOR 1.8.6 for fusion is applied for this deterministic safety analysis. The resulting releases of radioactivity to the environment are then provided for dose calculation using the computer systems UFOTRI and COSYMA. Outcomes of this LOVA analysis are critically discussed: the transient evolutions of different cases are compared; hydrogen production is detected in case of aggravating FW failure; the source terms (tritium, W-dust) are transported to the connected systems; and the dose results from the environmental releases are provided.
Bibliography:NF-106483.R1
ISSN:0029-5515
1741-4326
DOI:10.1088/1741-4326/ad383b