Cryptanalysis of a communication-efficient three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol

Cryptanalysis of a communication-efficient three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol

We revisit the communication-efficient three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol recently proposed by Chang et al. We show it is insecure against partition attacks, whereby the adversary can guess the correct password off-line. Thereafter we propose an enhanced protocol that can resis...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Information sciences Vol. 215; pp. 83 - 96
Main Authors: Wu, Shuhua, Pu, Qiong, Wang, Shengbao, He, Debiao
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier Inc 15-12-2012
Subjects:
Authenticated key exchange
Dictionary attack
Password-based
Three-party
Authenticated key exchange
Dictionary attack
Password-based
Three-party
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Summary:We revisit the communication-efficient three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol recently proposed by Chang et al. We show it is insecure against partition attacks, whereby the adversary can guess the correct password off-line. Thereafter we propose an enhanced protocol that can resist the attack described and yet is quite efficient. Furthermore, we prove its security in a widely accepted model.
ISSN:0020-0255
1872-6291
DOI:10.1016/j.ins.2012.06.005