Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games

• Published in: Econometrica Vol. 65; no. 6; pp. 1467 - 1477
• Main Authors: Lagunoff, Roger, Matsui, Akihiko
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Malden, MA Econometric Society 01-11-1997; Blackwell; George Banta Pub. Co. for the Econometric Society; Blackwell Publishing Ltd
• Subjects: Applied sciences; Asynchronous; Coordination games; Decision making; Dimensionality; Econometrics; Economic models; Economic statistics; Economic theory; Equilibrium; Exact sciences and technology; Game theory; Games; Inertia; Minimax; Nash equilibrium; Notes and Comments; Operational research and scientific management; Operational research. Management science; Pareto efficiency; Pareto optimum; Payoffs; Repeated games; Stochastic games; Studies; Player strategy; Game theory
• ISSN: 0012-9682; 1468-0262
• DOI: 10.2307/2171745

The standard model of repeated strategic play is a discretely repeated, simultaneous move game. This formulation assumes a perfect synchronization in the timing of actions between the players. Alternatively, this assumption may be interpreted as having each player move in ignorance of the other players' current move. While the synchronized move is not an unreasonable model of repetition in certain settings, it is not clear why it should necessarily be the benchmark setting for repeated play. Support for the study of a more general class of repeated interactions, those which include asynchronous choices, is given. The analysis is intended to be more suggestive than definitive. While the standard Folk Theorem will continue to be central to understanding repeated interactions, the types of games with asynchronous choice which is studied will yield, at times strikingly, different results.