Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals

Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals

The random utility model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this article is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without havin...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Political analysis Vol. 22; no. 2; pp. 243 - 257
Main Authors: Artabe, Alaitz, Gardeazabal, Javier
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: New York, US Cambridge University Press 2014
Oxford University Press
Subjects:
Constituents
Contrafactuals
Estimating techniques
Estimation methods
Inference
Political parties
Rum
Self reports
Voters
Voting
Voting behavior
Voting rights
Spain
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Description
Summary:The random utility model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this article is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without having to construct proxy measures of strategic voting incentives. Our method can be used to infer the counterfactual sincere vote of those who vote strategically and provides an estimate of the size of strategic voting. We illustrate the procedure using post-electoral survey data from Spain. Our calculations indicate that strategic voting in Spain is about 2.19%.
ISSN:1047-1987
1476-4989
DOI:10.1093/pan/mpt047