Gambling with Death
Orthodox expected utility theory imposes too stringent restrictions on what attitudes to risk one can rationally hold. Focusing on a life-and-death gamble, I identify as the main culprit the theory’s Linearity property, according to which the utility of a particular change in the risk of a bad outco...
Saved in:
Published in: | Topoi Vol. 39; no. 2; pp. 271 - 281 |
---|---|
Main Author: | |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Dordrecht
Springer Netherlands
01-04-2020
Springer Nature B.V |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | Orthodox expected utility theory imposes too stringent restrictions on what attitudes to risk one can rationally hold. Focusing on a life-and-death gamble, I identify as the main culprit the theory’s
Linearity
property, according to which the utility of a particular change in the risk of a bad outcome is independent of the original level of risk. Finally, I argue that a recent non-standard Bayesian decision theory, that does not have this property, handles risky gambles better than the orthodox theory. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0167-7411 1572-8749 1572-8749 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11245-017-9519-z |