Substitutable Protections: Credible Commitment Devices and Socioeconomic Insulation

• Published in: Political research quarterly Vol. 63; no. 1; pp. 115 - 128
• Main Authors: Staton, Jeffrey K., Reenock, Christopher
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Los Angeles, CA Sage Publications 01-03-2010; SAGE Publications; SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
• Subjects: Credible commitment; Democracy; Design; Economic Development; Economic models; Errors; Income distribution; Institutions; Insulation; Judicial system; Law reform; Legal reform; Legal systems; Modeling; Political economy; Political research; Political systems; Reform; Risk; Scholars; Social Order; Socioeconomics; Studies; Wealth; credible commitment; legal reform; order
• ISSN: 1065-9129; 1938-274X
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912908327394

Scholars have argued that credible commitment institutions have important impacts on political outcomes as diverse as economic growth and social order. If commitment institutions function as theorized, then their effects should vary across individuals, groups, or states, based on their respective vulnerability to promise breaking. Yet existing empirical studies never pursue this implication. The failure to do so risks a number of inferential errors and can lead to suboptimal policy prescriptions for institutional reform. In this article, the authors develop and provide empirical evidence for these claims within the context of a commitment problem that scholars believe undermines social order.