Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998

• Published in: American journal of political science Vol. 46; no. 4; pp. 699 - 716
• Main Authors: Iaryczower, Matías, Spiller, Pablo T., Tommasi, Mariano
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: University of Wisconsin Press 01-10-2002
• Subjects: Argentina; Coefficients; Congressional voting; Constitutional history; Constitutions; Decision making; Decisions; Impeachment; Intergovernmental Relations; Judges; Judicial Decisions; Judicial power; Judicial system; Judiciary; Legislature; Parliamentary government; Political attitudes; Political power; Political questions and judicial power; Political science; Separation of Powers; Solicitors general; Supreme Court; Supreme Court justices; Supreme Courts; Upper houses; Voting
• ISSN: 0092-5853; 1540-5907
• DOI: 10.2307/3088428

Argentina's constitution and electoral rules promote a fragmented polity. It is in those environments that independent judiciaries develop. Instead, most analysts do not consider the Argentina judiciary as independent. In this article we attempt to explain this contradiction by showing that this perception is inappropriate. We develop a test of the hypothesis that the judiciary is independent by empirically examining the political incentives faced by individual justices in their decision making. Our results show an often-defiant Court subject to constraints. Our measure of defiance is the probability of a nonaligned justice voting against the government. We find that judicial decision making was strategic. The probability of voting against the government falls the stronger the control of the president over the legislature, but increases the less aligned the justice is with the president. Thus, politics and process matter in understanding Argentina's Supreme Court decisions. Institutions matter in Argentina as well.