INTENTIONS AND MORAL PERMISSIBILITY: THE CASE OF ACTING PERMISSIBLY WITH BAD INTENTIONS

• Published in: Law and philosophy Vol. 31; no. 6; pp. 703 - 724
• Main Author: LIAO, S. MATTHEW
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer 01-11-2012; Springer Netherlands
• Subjects: Acting; Agency; Bombardiers; Bomber aircraft; Bombings; Children; Conceptualization; Consequentialism; Ethics; Fear; Individual behaviour; Just war; Law; Law and Criminology; Legal History; Morality; Philosophical thought; Philosophy of Law; Political Philosophy; Strategic behaviour; Terminal illnesses; Theories of Law; Moral Dimension; Trolley Problem; Intention Principle; Moral Permissibility; Innocent Child
• ISSN: 0167-5249; 1573-0522
• DOI: 10.1007/s10982-012-9134-5

Many people believe in the intention principle, according to which an agent's intention in performing an act can sometimes make an act that would otherwise have been permissible impermissible, other things being equal. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon have offered cases that seem to show that it can be permissible for an agent to act even when the agent has bad intentions. If valid, these cases would seem to cast doubt on the intention principle. In this paper, I point out that these cases have confounding factors that have received little attention in the literature. I argue that these confounding factors undermine the putative force of these cases against the intention principle. Indeed, when cases without these confounding factors are considered, it becomes clear, so I argue, that intentions can be relevant for the permissibility of an act.