Fixed income conference calls

• Published in: Journal of accounting & economics Vol. 75; no. 1; p. 101518
• Main Authors: De Franco, Gus, Shohfi, Thomas, Xu, Da, Zhu, Zhiwei (Vivi)
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier B.V 01-02-2023
• Subjects: Conference calls; Corporate bonds; Corporate debt; Debt investors; Debt-equity conflict events; Fixed income; Corporate bonds; M49; Debt-equity conflict events; Fixed income; Conference calls; G32; Corporate debt; G12; G14; Debt investors
• ISSN: 0165-4101; 1879-1980
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101518

We study the determinants and the informational role of firms' fixed income conference calls, a unique form of voluntary disclosure that deviates from the traditional multi-purpose firm disclosures intended for all stakeholders. We find that fixed income calls are more likely to be held by firms that have more debt, lack credit ratings or have publicly traded equity, are foreign, or are experiencing losses. In a content analysis using a sample of public firms, we find that these calls discuss debt-equity conflict events, such as share repurchases, to a greater degree relative to a matched sample of earnings conference calls. Finally, we document that credit markets react to these calls, consistent with the calls providing investors new information. Overall, these results are consistent with fixed income calls meeting the differential informational demands of debt versus equity investors.